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that the decline of some industries in the United States—as coal; soap,
and railway equipment—is in a real sense a sign of progress: the sup-
planting of worse by better means of doing the job. Are, then, gains by
the Soviet Union on the United States in output of coal, for instance,
to be viewed as indicating more rapid industrial advance?
Iv
Even in a discussion as incomplete as this one admittedly has been,
it would be improper to conclude without emphasizing once again that
we have been looking, from a few restricted points of view, at the
record of industrial achievement posted by the Soviet Union over the
entire period of its existence. The years under review include the two
world wars, a violent revolution, and a severe civil war—altogether
some eleven years of turbulence, a fourth of the period. They also
cover experience under both a planned and an. economy,
and these in turn have had disturbances of a severity that may not be
encountered again. There are obviously questions raised about how
trends are to be interpreted over times such as these.
At a minimum, account must be taken of the best years of growth,
which come down essentially to the periods 1928-3 7 and 1948-55.
These short spurts of growth have, of course, been much more rapid
than growth over the Soviet period as a whole. As -already mentioned,
there are good reasons for doubting that the performance in these short
periods can be sustained over the long haul. A number of unique cir-
cumstances that favored rapid expansion are not likely to be encoun-
tered again—including, for instance, the absorption of a vast idle labor
force and the sudden inheritance of Western technology. However this
might be, any judgment of Soviet industrial development should give
all due weight to performance under the best of conditions.5
products. This is, of course, an oversimplification, but it serves well enough here to point
up a significant difference. As a few specific examples of the austere- path of Soviet de-
velopment, one might note the persistently limited varieties of textiles, the retention of
basic tractor models for .two to three decades, and the slow progress made in packaging
consumer products. When one leaves the realm of "industry," the contrast is sharpened.
Nothing remotely similar to the expansion of service trades in this country has taken place
in the Soviet Union. It is perhaps well to stress that these remarks are directed to the
question of "general" industrial development, not to performance in special areas. In par-
ticular, nothing that has been said is inconsistent with Soviet successes in developing new
and increasingly deadly weapons of war, and in producing them in large quantity.
It is difficult to understand the argument that only the recent years of growth are of
any interest;i.e., that long-range performance is irrelevant for assessing growth trends.
However, in view of comments on this paper by Professor Grossman, it may be well to
indicate the general behavior of lags with 1928 as a bench mark year. For total output,
the median lag was 28 years in 1913, 45 years in 1928, and 34 years in 1955; the median
change in lags was an increase of 15 years for 1913-28 (based on data for 31 industries)
and a decrease of 9 years for 1928-55 (based on data for 32 industries). For per capita
output, the median change in lags was an increase of 15 years for 1913-28 (based on data
for 17 industries) and an increase of 0 years for 1928-55 (based on data for 24 industries).
That is to say, of the 24 industries for which changes in per capita lags can be computed
over the period 1928-55, haIl showed an increase and half a decrease. -SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 629
Some hint of what may come—and how it may differ from what has
been—is contained in Table 4, which gives the Soviet lags that will exist
in 1960 if the current Five-Year Plan is fulfilled. A quick comparison
with Tables 1 and 2 will show that the R'ussians expect to gain ground
generally over these five years, but the ground-gaining would not be
sufficient in some industries to prevent their still being further behind
us than in 1913. It remains to be seen to what extent the plans will be
TABLE 4
LAG oi SOVLET UNION BEHIND THE UNITED STATES ThT TOTAL AND PER CAPITA
OUTPUT AS IMPLIED BY THE SovIET PLAN FOR 1960, 24 INDUSTRJES*
"PLANNED" LAG FOR 1960
(Number of years)




































































Silk and synthetic fabrics






* Seesame note, Table 1, Soviet population in 1960 taken as 218 million.
t Soviet output, if achieved, will U.S. output through 1953.
met. Experience suggests the most likely failures will be in the realm
of consumer goods, particularly those based on agriculture. There is
no reason to suppose goals will not be reached in areas of high priority;
for, unless we have been massively deceived, they apparently have
been reached in the past. Tithe goal for steel ingots is reached, the lag
in total output will have fallen from 29 years in 1955 to 17 years in
1960, which is 4 years less than the lag in 1913; in something of a
contrast, the lag in per capita output—as based on the population
projected ahead by Soviet authorities—will have fallen only from 49
years to 47 years, which still exceeds the lag in 1913 by 17 years.630 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
If I may now end up where I started, I should like to call attention
once again to the heavy cloud of doubt and suspicion that must hang
over any study involving Soviet data. The recent de-Stalinizing period
has brought with it hopeful signs that Russian statistics may some day
move toward the standards of completeness and frankness met by
Western statistics, but it has also brought blistering internal indict-
ments of wholesale deception practiced in the past. Thus we may read
the following about industrial development in Poland, which may have
some application to developments in the Soviet Union:
It is necessary to stop the race for purely quantitative indices which are attained thanks
to low quality and to high own costs. This brings about purely fictitious results, the usage
of raw materials and of human labour for production of goods which do not produce the
intended economic, and often even the intended technicaleffects(e.g.,agricultural
machinery improper to any use after a few weeks).e
These words come from an economist who four years ago was out-
done by no one in the tribute he paid to Stalin and the Soviet system.7
If the ebb and flow of political fortune can bring such a complete re-
versal in the position taken by Oskar Lange, we may only speculate on
what the truth really is in the Soviet world.
Oskar Lange, "For a New Economic Program," translated from the Polish by J. Vanek
and reproduced for private circulation by the Center for International Studies, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, October, 1956. The article originally appeared in Zycie
Gospodarcze (Warsaw) for July 16, 1956. The quotation is taken from5 of the trans-
lation.
See,e.g., Oskar Lange, "The Economic Laws of Socialist Society in the Light of
Joseph Stalin's Last Work," International Economic Papers, No. 4 (London and New
York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 145-180, a translation of an article appearing originally in
Polish in Zi7auka Poiska, No. 1 (Warsaw, 1953).